Sale of Food Aid as Sign of Distress not Excess
Summary of Published Paper
In February 1996, WFP reduced rations for
refugees in Uvira, Zaire by 20% when visiting donors noted that food aid,
primarily maize and oil, was being sold in local markets and even exported.
The donors' interpretation was that the refugees were getting too much
food aid. UNHCR undertook a study to explore the causes of the food aid
The refugees in the eleven Uvira camps
were Burundian and Rwandan. Before the ration reduction, refugees received
maize, beans, oil, CSB and salt amounting to 1936 kcals per capita. After
the ration reduction, refugees received between 1491 and 1594 kcals. The
maize was usually yellow maize and the oil was unfortified vegetable oil.
The UNHCR study began with observation
and open-ended interviews with key informants drawn from refugees, camp
workers and Zairian farmers. Subsequently, 1005 households were randomly
selected in order to study buying, selling and eating patterns. The households
were classified into four income groups according to income source.
Maize, and less frequently, other
commodities, were sold to obtain cash for other items - most commonly salt
and soap - neither of which had been consistently distributed. Maize was
the first choice for sale. The dried corn was unfamiliar and not liked.
Cooked as whole grain, the maize required much fuel. Women complained that
the maize caused diarrhoea and that their children could not or would not
eat it. Parents sold it to buy fruit, sugar and cassava flour for small
children. When possible, parents gave CSB to young children, but it had
only been distributed twice during a 10-month period. Refugees bartered
vegetable oil for an equal quantity of locally produced palm oil. Refugees
preferred the taste of the latter.
Forty two percent of household reported
some foodaid sales and 80% of these had most recently sold maize. Fifty
four percent had sold oil at least once. Reasons for sales were to purchase
another food, to break dietary monotony or to balance their diet
(49%). Twenty five percent of sales were to buy salt and 12% because of
intolerance to a commodity (usually oil). Households with the lowest income
were twice as likely to have sold or exchanged food aid proceeds than were
Key informants reported that the food distributed
for 15 day periods lasted only 2-10 days depending on the commodity. In
the week preceding the survey 45% of households had gone without eating
for at least a day.
In Uvira, refugees were selling food aid
commodities to satisfy basic dietary and non-food needs, most of which
would have been satisfied if relief targets for distribution had been met.
A quarter of food aid sales reported would have been avoided with delivery
of promised salt. The energy cost of maize sold to buy salt for one day
for a family of five was 350 kcals per person (25% of what was actually
delivered). Soap lasted 2 days on average and half a bar of soap was equivalent
to the cost of 1.5 kgs of maize. When soap was not delivered scabies
became rampant. In the Uvira camps there were no complementary foods like
meat, fish, vegetables or fruit distributed. Although there was some cultivation
it was inadequate in terms of providing complementary foods, at least during
the dry season. So the primary means of getting additional food was via
sale of general ration commodities..
The glut of maize on the market was clearly
due to its low acceptability. It was sold even though it brought the lowest
return per calorie. Sale of smaller quantities of beans or oil to
buy salt would have resulted in loss of fewer calories. The authors of
the study assert that maize was distributed to unload donor surpluses,
and that WFP even bought maize in Africa for distribution to these refugees
because no other cereal was available at a comparable price per unit energy
. Maize would have been more acceptable if milled - as was WFP policy.
However, WFP/HCR were unsuccessful in establishing milling facilities
in Uvira. It is further asserted that instead of reacting negatively
to refugees trading as a coping strategy refugee organisations should have
facilitated the market. The provision of salt and the substitution of oil
or CSB or rice in the ration for maize would have permitted refugees to
buy greater amounts of other foods.
The study concludes that reasons behind
food aid sales must be explored before rations are reduced. In Uvira, the
reduction in the rations merely exacerbated problems originating from inefficient
international relief efforts. Choice of food commodities, without due consideration
for cultural preference, micronutrient needs and food preparation requirements,
can lead to a marked reduction in energy intake. It reinforces the wisdom
of existing policies that mandate the delivery of culturally acceptable
foods, including non-caloric items like salt, the provision of cereals
in milled form and access by refugees to complementary foods. The fact
that more than three quarters of households did not have sufficient
diets and that rations were reduced because food sales had been misinterpreted
by donors and responded to inappropriately by WFP is disheartening.
Sale of Food Aid as Sign of Distress
not Excess, Reed. B and Habicht, J.P (1998) The Lancet, Vol 351, January
Taken from Field Exchange Issue 4, June 1998