WFP intervention in Bosnia Herzegovina '92 - '97
An internal evaluation
In Field Exchange Issue
III a field article described the current situation in Bosnia and the reconstruction
process, drawing out implications for food security and
the future of food aid.
This WFP evaluation touches on a number of related food aid issues.
The World Food Programme
has recently completed an evaluation of the emergency food aid programme
in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) from its inception in 1992 to June 1997. The
evaluation set out to assess the relevance, timeliness, efficiency and
effects of food assistance and related services and to derive lessons for
possible application in similar emergencies and post-emergency situations.
Some key issues identified for evaluation were:
- an assessment of
capacity to respond to beneficiary needs involving assessment of targeting,
monitoring, management and staffing issues,
- relevance of food aid
in a period of reconstruction,
- the future of food aid
in BiH and,
- the effects of the emergency
operation on the war itself.
The Operation
From 1991 to late 1992,
UNHCR were mainly responsible for food aid provision in BiH. From
1992 to 1995 WFP took on the responsibility for delivery of most of the
food aid to extended delivery points (EDPs) outside BiH . Then, in the
transition period from 1995 to 1997, during which time the Dayton peace
agreement was signed and hostilities ended, management of the food chain
within BiH was handed over to WFP. By September 1997 over 1.14 million
tons of food had been provided and up until the end of 1996 an average
of 2.6 million people a year were being reached. The majority were
located inside BiH. At the height of the conflict in BiH there were about
1.2 million IDPs and 1.4 million war affected people. An estimated 80%
of the people of BiH have at one time or another been beneficiaries of
food aid supplied by WFP and UNHCR
Evaluation Findings
Co-operation between the
two agencies (WFP and UNHCR) was good. However, frequent gaps in the pipeline
resulting from difficulties in mobilising and maintaining an adequate response
from donors, occasionally gave rise to some tensions within and between
the agencies.
Supply of assistance under
war conditions
Food distributed did cover
the population's most urgent needs even though only rudimentary data
were available for assessment purposes. No widespread hunger or malnutrition
occurred despite weaknesses in the food aid pipeline. Later in this emergency,
targeting became increasingly feasible so that localised under or
over supply was gradually corrected. However, in the case of
isolated populations of besieged cities, poor access due to insecurity
made distribution difficult. Air-lifts were frequently used. The
Sarajevo airlift was the longest running humanitarian air-bridge in history
(July 3rd 1992 to 9th Jan 1996). "When access by land was denied, distribution
was by air transport, as in the difficult and relatively successful airdrop
operations in Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa. It seems that only in Bihac
was it not possible to stave off hunger by such means in late 1994 and
1995". The evaluation team concluded that more attention could have been
paid to maximising the amounts of food delivered, by providing food items
chosen because of their high nutritional value in relation
to their volume.
Unintended consequences
The evaluation outlined
two lines of argument to support the view that the aid programme somehow
prolonged the conflict.
- by giving generous
support the donors were able to defend themselves against the charge of
inaction thereby postponing military action.
However there was no evidence
that aid deflected public opinion from support for a military intervention.
Moreover, as the humanitarian intervention brought with it additional media
coverage, a precursor to the eventual intervention, this hypothesis was
thought to have little credibility.
- aid gave material assistance
to the combatants and therefore prolonged conflict.
Of course aid did support
the military effort. Even if supplies were not diverted to combatants,
the provision of aid, including food aid, would have allowed the diversion
to the war of resources which would otherwise have been needed to sustain
the non-combatant population. However, the evaluators were not convinced
that the risks of increased suffering that would have occurred in the absence
of humanitarian support would have been justified by an increase in the
prospect of a swifter and satisfactory outcome of the conflict. Nevertheless,
the provision of aid, including food aid, did have some unavoidable negative
political effects. Since access for the distribution of assistance was
under the control of the authorities in situ, bargaining with them and
agreeing to using the channels under their control, reinforced their authority.
Also, in some cases, food taxes were levied by the military authorities
to allow convoys to pass. One conclusion is that under war conditions
humanitarian agencies must select staff in terms of their capacity to engage
continually in stressful negotiations with difficult interlocutors, and
to remain firm even under threat, without jeopardising the continuity of
the operation.
Targeting and Monitoring:
The evaluation team asserted that efforts made to target food aid
were commendable throughout the war under extremely difficult conditions.
However, monitoring was hampered by a lack of resources despite continuous
requests for support from donors, who were in fact anxious to receive monitoring
reports.
Nevertheless, monitors did
cover as many distribution points as possible and obtained sufficient information
to indicate that the priority categories of beneficiaries were receiving
appropriate rations. With the end of hostilities a decision was made to
scale down the food aid programme. The decision was justified on the basis
that food should not be seen as an alternative to a social welfare system.
However, as food aid was scaled down the evaluators were concerned that
the national authorities and donor agencies should take steps required
to create an effective social welfare system. This became now a matter
of urgency. Intensifying efforts to refine targeting became an issue
almost immediately after the signing of the peace accord. The overriding
factor was donor pressure. A policy decision was made calling for a reduction
in the quantities of food to be delivered and hence the need for a reduction
in the number of beneficiaries to be assisted. In April 1996 the food aid
assessment mission recommended reducing the number of direct beneficiaries
(i.e. those eligible for general distribution) to an overall target of
600,000 people or around 20 percent of the population. Although the criteria
may have been accepted by local authorities, progress in their application
has been slow. Despite considerable competence and capacity within the
local authorities, the concept of targeting is apparently not very well
accepted. There appears to be little motivation to put in place a targeting
system. It seems that to give a little to nearly everyone, without regard
to needs, has been preferable to an exclusive targeted distribution based
on need. Other difficulties with the process of scaling down and
re-targeting the operation were highlighted: the exercise is being undertaken
quite rapidly, allowing authorities little time to make a reliable census
or establish structures to assist people who will no longer appear on the
lists. The 20% figure is arbitrary in that there are no data to predict
the distribution of the population in terms of income level or other chosen
criteria. It is unlikely that the local authorities will have sufficient
human or financial resources to complete a census/survey properly even
if they were motivated to do so.
With the required precision
in targeting and the rapid reduction in beneficiary numbers, monitoring
activities have had to become more sophisticated, requiring more technically
skilled staff and more resources. But again, and despite donor demands
for more data, the necessary funding has not been forthcoming.
Reference:UNHCR/WFP Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Food Assistance to Returnees, Refugees, Displaced
Persons and Other War-Affected Populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
WFP, Executive Board Second Regular Session, Rome 12-15 May 1998. Evaluation
Reports, Agenda item 3 Internet:http://www.wfp.org
Contacts: WFP Office
of Evaluation, e-mail: sacha.cooper@wfp.org
Taken from Field Exchange Issue 5, October 1998
http://fex.ennonline.net/5/wfp